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Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which propositions may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately. This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true); and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism. Many philosophers claim that moral realism may be dated back at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine,〔''Plato's Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics'', by John M. Rist (Jul 15, 2012)〕 and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.〔''Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine'', (New Directions in Ethics), by Matthew H. Kramer 〕 One study found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).〔(PhilPapers survey, 2009 ), under the heading 'Meta-ethics'〕 Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,〔Brink, David O., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).〕 John McDowell, Peter Railton,〔Railton, Peter (1986). "Moral Realism". ''Philosophical Review'', 95, pp. 163-207.〕 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,〔Sayre-McCord, Geoff (2005). "Moral Realism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition)'', Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ((link ))〕 Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,〔Cuneo, Terence (2007). "The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism", Oxford.〕 Russ Shafer-Landau,〔Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003) "Moral Realism: A Defense", Oxford, ISBN 0-19-925975-5.〕 G.E. Moore,〔 * Moore, G. E. (1903). ''Principia Ethica'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.〕 John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,〔Sturgeon, Nicholas (1985). "Moral Explanations", in ''Morality, Reason, and Truth'', edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 49-78.〕 Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.〔Geras, Norman (1985). "The Controversy about Marx and Justice", ''New Left Review'', 150, pp. 47-85.〕 Moral realism has been studied in the various philosophical and practical applications.〔''Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications'', (New Forum Books), by Daniel N. Robinson (Jul 29, 2002).〕 ==Robust versus minimal moral realism== A delineation of moral realism into a minimal form, a moderate form, and robust form has been put forward in the literature.〔Sturgeon, Nicholas (1985). "Moral Explanations", in ''Morality, Reason, and Truth'', edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 49-78.〕 The robust model of moral realism commits moral realists to three theses:〔Väyrynen, Pekka (2005). "Moral Realism", ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition'', Donald M. Borchert (ed.). ((link ))〕 # ''The semantic thesis:'' The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false, and so on). # ''The alethic thesis:'' Some moral propositions are in fact true. # ''The metaphysical thesis:'' Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of) ordinary non-moral facts and properties. The minimal model, i.e. moral universalism, leaves off the metaphysical thesis, treating it as matter of contention ''among'' moral realists (as opposed to ''between'' moral realists and moral anti-realists). This dispute is not insignificant, as acceptance or rejection of the metaphysical thesis is taken by those employing the robust model as the key difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism. Indeed, the question of how to classify certain logically possible (if eccentric) views—such as the rejection of the semantic and alethic theses in conjunction with the acceptance of the metaphysical thesis—turns on which model we accept.〔Joyce, Richard (2007), "Moral Anti-Realism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition)'', Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ((link ))〕 Someone employing the robust model might call such a view "realist non-cognitivism," while someone employing the minimal model might simply place such a view alongside other, more traditional, forms of non-cognitivism. The robust model and the minimal model also disagree over how to classify moral subjectivism (roughly, the view that moral facts are not mind-independent in the relevant sense, but that moral statements may still be true). The historical association of subjectivism with moral anti-realism in large part explains why the robust model of moral realism has been dominant—even if only implicitly—both in the traditional and contemporary philosophical literature on metaethics.〔 In the minimal sense of realism, R.M. Hare could be considered a realist in his later works, as he is committed to the objectivity of value judgments, even though he denies that moral statements express propositions with truth-values per se. Moral constructivists like John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard〔Korsgaard, Christine (1996). ''The Sources of Normativity'', New York: Cambridge University Press.〕 may also be realists in this minimalist sense; the latter describes her own position as procedural realism. Some readings of evolutionary science such as those of Charles Darwin and James Mark Baldwin have suggested that in so far as an ethics may be associated with survival strategies and natural selection then such behavior may be associated with a moderate position of moral realism equivalent to an ethics of survival. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Moral realism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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